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Kaarle Nordenstreng and jukka Pietiläinen
Media as a Mirror of Change
Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of the interface between hard forces of 
economy and politics, on the one hand, and soft elements of culture and eve-
ryday life, on the other – generally known as “mass media” or just “media” 
(both in singular and plural). The concept typically includes printed media 
(newspapers, magazines, books), electronic media (radio, television, film, 
video, records) and recently also the so-called online media (Internet-based 
forums, blogs, websites). Its core is news journalism but it extends to enter-
tainment and arts as well as to education and business.
Russia inherited from the Soviet Union a highly developed media sys-
tem. Technically and in terms of reaching the population the Soviet media 
were from the 1950s among the top twenty in world statistics. In terms of 
its socio-political content, however, the Soviet “Communist” media system 
constituted a type of its own in the so-called press theories around the world 
(Christians et al. 2009). Post-Soviet Russia provides a historical laboratory for 
studying the nature of media-society relations; Sarah Oates (2009, 37) refers 
to “the incredible experience of the post-Soviet media system (…) particu-
larly useful for evaluating the utility of media ‘models’”. The laboratory has 
not yet produced a final reading of the historical case, but the contemporary 
Russian media landscape still suggests some central aspects of the change 
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from the former Soviet system to today’s more or less stabilized Russia. These 
characteristics are highlighted below with references to recent scholarship on 
Russian media, including our own research.1
The nature of media
The first aspect of change deals with the idea of media itself. Mass media in 
Russian are traditionally called sredstva massovoi informatsii (SMI), which 
literally means “instruments of mass information”. Sometimes even the word 
“propaganda” was added to this term: sredstva massovoi informatsii i propa-
gandy. This implies an idea that the media are technical instruments; they 
mediate the messages emanating from sources of power to the public at large, 
and this receiving public will then turn the message flow into “mass infor-
mation” or “mass consciousness”. Such an instrumental notion of the mass 
media fits well with the Communist system – but it also fits with the capitalist 
consumer society where media typically operate as vehicles for controlling 
the social consciousness and for selling audiences to advertisers.
A simple SMI notion of the media has in post-Soviet Russia been replaced 
by a more complex notion, whereby media are not just technical instruments 
but more or less autonomous actors, although the term SMI continues to be 
used. Current media are, at least in theory, more versatile and independent 
than they were during Communism. But again, the same is true of the media 
in the so-called Western world. There is a universal trend for the media in 
developed market economies to constitute a sphere of its own – mediasphere 
– which not only suggests that the media are more autonomous in directing 
public opinion but also that they perform a more fundamental role in society 
1 Kaarle Nordenstreng was the director of the Academy of Finland project Media in a Changing Russia 
(2006–2008), with jukka Pietiläinen working in the project team along with Katja Koikkalainen and Svet-
lana Pasti. A parallel Academy project Making a Good Life at the University of Tampere was directed by 
Professor Arja Rosenholm. Both projects had a Russian partner team, the first based in Moscow State Uni-
versity with Elena vartanova as team leader and the second based in Ural State University, Ekaterinburg, 
with Elena Trubina as team leader. A common anthology of these projects has been edited by Rosenholm, 
Nordenstreng and Trubina (2010). Part of this chapter is based on Pietiläinen’s paper prepared for confer-
ence Beyond East and West at the Central European University in Budapest on 25–27 june 2009.
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by mediating social and economic relations between people and institutions. 
Indeed, mediation and mediatization have become buzzwords in contempo-
rary media studies everywhere (Couldry 2008; Hjarvard 2008).
In post-Soviet Russia, however, the notion of media has undergone an ad-
ditional change: from instruments in the service of central power to platforms 
reflecting various social actors. These contrasting roles are seen in media the-
ory along a dimension which runs between the extremes of an outside and 
neutral observer of events in society, or a mirror for looking at the world, on 
the one hand, and on the other, an active participant in running and changing 
society, or a weapon to fight in the world. In this view, the earlier SMI media 
were active and partisan weapons, while the later mediasphere is seen to op-
erate as a more or less passive and neutral mirror (Nordenstreng 2006; 2007). 
Accordingly, “mirror” in the title of this chapter is a considered choice. A 
related term is glasnost, which can be seen as another way of expressing the 
idea of a faithful mirror of society. As shown by Reino Paasilinna (1995, 12), 
Gorbachev was not the first to employ it in Russia; it has been used since the 
18th century, among others by Pushkin and Gorki – as well as lenin. Actually, 
glasnost should not only be seen as the other side of perestroika of the late 
1980s but as a concept deeply embedded in Russian culture. It parallels the 
Western understanding that in essence media and journalism has the trans-
parency of glass (Glasser 1996).
Waves of change 
An overview of the historical change, which shook the Russian socio-political 
system during the last three decades of the 20th century and the first decade of 
the new millennium, was presented in five waves in Ivan zassoursky’s chap-
ter in Russian Media Challenge (zassoursky 2002). The same periodization 
is included in zassoursky’s Media and Power in Post-Soviet Russia (2004). 
Stephen Hutchings and Natalia Rulyova (2009, 14) characterize it among the 
surveys of developments around Russian media as “the defining work in this 
category”.
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The table showing the transformation of the media system in the Soviet 
Union and Russia from 1970 to 2000 speaks for itself and is reproduced in 
Table 1.2
looking ahead beyond these waves of change, Ivan zassoursky writes in 
the early 2000s:
For the younger generation of Russians, Putin’s administration is seen as struggling with 
petty old problems of national identity, law, order, and the like. The school of chaos they 
faced through the nineties let them adapt to any conditions and turn to private lives as 
spheres of self-realization while almost completely ignoring the virtual community of 
the nation state. And here lies the seed of the next social project that may look nicer 
than the “Great Russia” national identity that seems to emerge as a symbol of the Putin 
era. However, this does not mean the younger audience detests that strong state ideal. 
(zassoursky 2002, 84.)
We shall return to these prospects for the future at the end of this chapter, 
after reviewing the Russian media landscape from the angles of economic 
structure, audience consumption, content culture and socio-political trends.
Media structure
In Russia, the media structure largely collapsed with the Soviet system. Ear-
lier centralized structure was replaced by a regionalized and localized media 
model, with television remaining the only really national media. In Russian 
television the role of sponsorship and dependence on outside funding was 
crucial in the 1990s and led to oligarch media empires. Since 2000 the role 
of the state has been strengthened, but it has not resulted in West-European 
style public service television; instead a combination of market strategy and 
state control has emerged.
Before the collapse, the newspaper circulation was heavily concentrated 
on a small number of national newspapers. In 1990, 43 national newspapers 
2 This version is based on zassoursky 2004, 22–3, but is abridged to include mainly media-related aspects 
of the five periods. It has been updated by the author himself.
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Table 1. The Media-Political History of Russia Since 1970, according to Ivan zassoursky
The Media-Political History of Russia since 1970, according to Ivan Zassoursky 
1970–1985 1986–1990 1991–1995 1996–2000 2000–?
Political
system
USSR
corporation 
management. 
One power 
centre. 
Shifting and 
shaking.
Democratic 
reforms coincide 
with “dry” law 
and tobacco 
shortage. 
No system. 
Struggle. 
Complete de-
centralization. 
Strong
opposition.  
Mediated, strong 
regional leaders. 
Media holdings 
as political 
parties. Elected 
monarchy. 
Centralized 
system based on 
law enforcement 
agencies and 
army. Weak 
opposition.  
Ideology Communist-
imperialist, 
evidently false 
but pervasive. 
Stable. 
Democratization, 
socialist reforms. 
Optimistic. 
Market funda-
mentalism, 
democratic 
reforms, anti-
Communism.  
No coherent 
belief system. 
Symbolic space 
around dramatic 
conflicts. 
Nationalism 
(strong state + 
monopolism) vs. 
enemies and 
global turbulence
Social
dream
Welfare 
consumer 
society 
Public sphere + 
the West 
Welfare state Law and order Great Russia 
Media
system
type
Propaganda 
machine 
Glasnost- 
propaganda 
machine 
“Fourth 
power”, 
independent 
media 
Media-political 
system, society 
of the spectacle 
Instrumental 
media, social 
responsibility 
Media
system
structure 
Newspaper-
based, radio 
important, 
state-
controlled TV 
(3 channels) 
Newspaper-
based, stronger 
TV, strong radio 
Transforming: 
printed press 
in decline, 
broad-casting 
on the rise  
Media-political 
system in the 
commercial 
media 
environment 
State-controlled 
media in 
commercial 
environment vs. 
the Internet. 
Journalist
roles  
Instrumental  Important, 
especially in 
printed press 
Extremely 
important  
Almost 
completely 
instrumental 
Defined in 
professional 
terms 
Media
leaders
Pravda, 
Izvestiia,
Radio 1 and 
Radio 
“Maiak”.
Strong state 
controlled 
publishing and 
film industry. 
Moskovskie 
Novosti, Ogonëk,
literary and 
intellectual 
almanacs. 
Radio “Liberty”. 
Izvestiia, 
Moskovskii 
Komsomolets, 
Nezavisimaia 
Gazeta. 
Kommersant,
Russian TV 2, 
NTV
Public Russian 
Television ORT, 
NTV, FM radio, 
elite press 
(Kommersant),
magazines 
(Cosmopolitan).
Film industry. 
State-controlled 
TV, entertain-
ment TV, FM 
radio, tabloids. 
Online media, 
blogs, social 
networks, video, 
gaming, instant 
messaging. 
Media
opposition
Samizdat, oral 
speech, 
anecdotes. 
Russian-
language radio 
stations and 
newspapers 
based abroad. 
Radical samizdat 
+ conservative 
Communists 
(Sovetskaia
Rossiia). 
Communist 
newspapers 
(Pravda, 
Sovetskaia 
Rossiia),
nationalist 
(Den’). 
Communist, 
nationalist and 
alternative media 
(Trava i volia, 
Radek). 
Representation 
(TV, radio, 
press) versus 
Communication 
(new and mobile 
media).
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shared 49% of the total newspaper circulation of the whole Soviet Union (Pi-
etiläinen 2002, 108). The collapse was even more dramatic than in most of 
Central East European (CEE) countries, because the media system was more 
centralized and more vulnerable to suddenly rising costs. In Russia most of 
the national as well as many regional newspapers lost over 90% of their cir-
culation. According to official statistics, the circulation of national dailies 
dropped from 80 million copies in 1990 to 5 million copies in 1998, and since 
then decreased to 2.4 million in 2001, but since then increased again to 4.1 
million in 2008.3 distribution of newspapers was formerly based on subscrip-
tions, but the new newspapers found retail sales a more viable way of distri-
bution in conditions of hyperinflation. 
In the early 1990s, most of the newspapers were privatized to their staff, 
while new oligarchs gained influence in many television channels. The line 
between public and private disappeared, since the ORT (Public Russian Tel-
evision), even if 51% of it was formally owned by the state, in practice got its 
financing from businessman Boris Berezovskii and was under his influence. 
Russian oligarchs used their influence over the media in order to gain assets 
in other businesses privatized by the state. The victory of the oligarchic media 
system was apparent in the 1996 presidential elections when political and 
economic power holders joined together in order to ensure the re-election of 
President Boris Yeltsin, whose popularity only half a year before the elections 
was extremely low. 
The ownership of the Russian media industry is now divided between gov-
ernmentally controlled state capital and privately controlled commercial cap-
ital, the latter comprising both domestic and foreign ownership. The trend in 
the 2000s has been a decrease of commercial capital and a relative increase of 
state capital as the base for media enterprises, notably through mixed forms 
of ownership. This trend is accompanied by a concentration of the media 
industry, with three main players in the arena: a state enterprise (vGTRK) 
operating in Tv, radio and Internet; a mixed conglomerate (Gazprom-Me-
dia) running Tv, radio, press, cinema and advertising agencies; and a purely 
3 Pechat RF… in 1990, 1998, 2001 and 2008; figures include newspapers which come out at least 4 times 
a week.
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commercial structure (Prof-Media) in Tv, radio, press, cinema and Internet. 
The Russian media system is also characterized by a trend towards regional 
industries in coordination with the central players. Regionalization and con-
vergence of different media, including the Internet, are key aspects of the 
dynamically developing system. (vartanova & Smirnov, 2010)
In terms of economy, Elena vartanova and Sergei Smirnov (ibid.) dem-
onstrate, first of all, the impressive size and diversity of the current media 
industry. Its growth rate, especially for advertising during the first decade of 
the new millennium, has reached the level of Western industrial countries 
(typically 1% of gross domestic product). Yet Russian media companies are 
still rather weak and it has been estimated (ROMIR Monitoring 2004, 3) that 
only in 2010 will Russia have enough consumers with income on such a level 
that there will be sufficient demand for independent media. The global eco-
nomic crisis and significant drop (about 30%) in advertising revenue may 
have moved this deadline later, even if it was initially supposed to be realistic.
As far as foreign ownership is concerned, it did not become an important 
feature in the post-Soviet media system, while in the CEE countries eight out 
of ten largest media companies are nowadays foreign. The only segments of 
significant foreign ownership can be found in magazines, economic newspa-
pers and radio, but even here Russia differs from most CEE countries. Five 
out of ten largest magazine publishing houses are foreign or partly foreign 
(Finnish, French, American and two German companies) and these foreign 
companies publish five out of top the ten magazines in terms of advertis-
ing revenues (Russian Periodical Press Market 2008, 39, 51). The first foreign 
magazine Burda started its Russian version during the Soviet era in 1987. Es-
pecially after 1998 with the increase of economic growth foreign brands have 
increasingly launched Russian versions. The economic crisis of 2008–2009 
has already caused the closure of some of them, which tells about uncertain-
ties of Russian market, and also about unrealistic expectations. 
In the newspaper market only two out of the top ten publishers are for-
eign. In the business press one of the leading daily newspapers, Vedomosti, 
is published by the Finnish owners Independent Media Sanoma Magazines, 
while the Swedish company Bonnier has since 1997 published a daily busi-
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ness newspaper Delovoi Peterburg in St. Petersburg and has started a similar 
regional publication Delovaia gazeta Iug in Southern Russia as well. A similar 
marginal case is the publishing of English-language newspapers, of which 
two most important ones, The Moscow Times and St. Petersburg Times belong 
to the above-mentioned Finnish company.
In comparison with the CEE countries, the Russian media market remains 
mainly under national ownership and Russian media companies have even 
expanded to neighbouring countries like Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. 
The size of the country is certainly one explanation. The Russian media mar-
ket is very fragmented: most newspaper publishing consists of regional and 
local media, which are usually owned locally and in only few cases (the news-
paper Zhizn’, started as a network of regional newspapers, is one exception) 
has any cross-regional ownership or co-operation. In regional newspapers 
foreign ownership is rare, because most regional media companies are eco-
nomically not viable or competitive enough in order to attract foreign inves-
tors. Also, the political risks may be too high. 
In Russian television, foreign ownership also remains low in comparison 
with most CEE countries. There have been attempts to limit the ownership of 
television companies by foreign companies. The first of these attempts was a 
proposed law on television and radio broadcasting which was never approved 
(Richter 2002, 134). In 2001 the Russian Mass media legislation was amended 
with a ban of foreign ownership of more than a 50 percent stake in Tv chan-
nels covering more than half the country. More recently, in 2008, a new law 
on foreign investments in sectors of strategic importance defined television 
and radio companies as “strategic”, which means that a foreign individual or 
firm will need approval before becoming a majority (over 50%) shareholder.
Summing up developments in the media landscape since the 1980s, the 
sociologist Mikhail Chernysh singles out differentiation as the keyword:
The first stage involved differentiation in line with political change, the emergence of 
pluralism and party politics. The second stage came when the rich or well-to-do strata 
needed urgently information of how to live, to build up a comfortable life. Hence came 
the Domovoi and other glossy magazines. The third stage related to a break-up of soci-
ety into new market-embedded professionals and the rest of the population. It brought 
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about new journals and magazines dedicated to business and management. And lastly 
came the time when further differentiation of the market had to account for leisure 
and lifestyle practices. Now the market is guided not by politics but by consumer prac-
tices and the need for satisfaction of specific needs. What has been said is also true for 
electronic media: the decline of politics led to the emergence of new entertainment Tv 
channels and radio stations with very specific music formats. 
Equally crucial is the gradual rise of the cyberspace media. The Internet signified a 
new kind of democracy when reader had a chance to partake in the making of the final 
media product. Most traditional media had to react to the new Internet age, by opening 
up to public, engaging in lively discussion with its readers, by listening to what the read-
ers had to say on this or that topic.4
The media scholar Elena vartanova (2009), for her part, raises market as 
the most important factor of change. In her overview of the developments of 
competition and convergence, contemporary market-driven media, increas-
ingly dependent on new information technologies, take into account the in-
terests of advertisers and audiences more than ever. The structure of national 
and regional/local media markets is being increasingly shaped by the wants 
and needs of these players, and this process seems to minimize the traditional 
impact of politics on Russian media performance and activities. However, the 
change is complex and full of contradictions as indeed is Russian society as a 
whole. Accordingly, the contemporary media landscape also reveals “replace-
ment of information with opinions, self-censorship and large role of the state 
in the public space” (ibid., 297). 
Media consumption
The most important change in Russian media use during the last twenty 
years has been the change from a nation of readers to a nation of Tv viewers 
(dubin 2001, 298–300). The second most important change is the different 
development of newspapers and magazines. Newspapers, even if they are still 
read by two-thirds of Russians, are losing their popularity, while magazines 
4 Personal communication with Professor Mikhail Chernysh of the Institute of Sociology, Russian Acad-
emy of Sciences, Moscow (April 2009).
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are increasing their readership. The third most important change has been 
the differentiation of newspapers and this has also caused some differences 
in the readership structure of different newspapers. According to a national 
survey conducted in 2007, over 98% of Russians watch television, while only 
66% read newspapers, 53% listen to radio and only 38% read magazines (Pi-
etiläinen 2008, 367; see also vartanova 2002; Belin 2002). 
Newspaper circulation boomed during perestroika but started to fall as 
early as 1991. Economic collapse and hyperinflation caused further reduc-
tions in 1992 and 1993, although the number of newspaper titles increased 
significantly. The fall in circulation has not been uniform and new weekly 
newspapers, in particular, have been able to gain new readers. A degree of 
differentiation is in progress among the print media: some newspapers serve 
“the information needs of an educated elite, while other newspapers are ca-
tering for the mass taste” (voltmer 2000, 494).
The proportion of the population which reads newspapers is thus decreas-
ing. In 1998 some 75% read some newspaper regularly, while in 2007 only 
66% had read a newspaper in the previous week. Some signs of a declined 
interest in newspapers were visible a few years ago when the number of peo-
ple who felt that newspapers had become more interesting dropped rapidly 
from 58% in 1998 to 34% in 2001 (zorkaia 2005, 61). The winners in this 
competition among newspapers for readers have usually been various televi-
sion guides, of which Antenna-Telesem is the most prominent. Newspapers 
devoted to sports have also gained in popularity. Newspapers have lost their 
popularity especially in larger cities, while in small towns and rural areas the 
most important local newspapers in many cases reach over 50% of the popu-
lation. Newspapers of smaller towns have also in many cases shown a high 
degree of professionalism and independence (Eismont 2007). larger cities 
are a battle ground for regional editions of national newspapers which have 
been emerging since the end of 1990s and been part of the restoration of the 
national press. 
The magazines have developed quite differently from the newspapers. 
While most of today’s popular newspapers existed in the Soviet era, most 
contemporary popular magazines were almost all founded after the collapse 
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of the Soviet Union. Russian magazines have faced tough competition from 
foreign formats. It is likely that a more flexible operation of journals in the 
media market (more oriented towards retail sales than subscriptions; an in-
come structure based on selling price more than advertisements) and usu-
ally less politicized content made it possible for foreign owners to enter the 
Russian magazine market, while the newspaper market has remained largely 
closed to foreign owners.
Radio, especially music radio, has also been one of the success stories, 
mainly because of lower production costs, attractiveness to advertisers due 
to high targetability, decreasing politicization and improved professionalism 
(vartanova 2002, 57). The radio channels people choose to listen to varies 
considerably depending on age and partly on gender.
Magazines, radio and (entertainment) television are the most Westernized 
sectors of the media and the most adapted to the new economic and political 
conditions. Newspapers, on the other hand, are lagging behind. Some news-
papers have successfully adopted a popular style and have been successful 
in gaining readers and achieving a certain financial independence. On the 
other hand, serious quality newspapers are seldom independent, often be-
ing linked with political power struggles. Those sectors of the media which 
have Westernized most rapidly are more popular in cities and among young 
people than in more traditional regions and population groups. The same is 
true of the Internet. Most Westernized television channels, the entertainment 
channels STS and TNT in particular, have also increased their popularity, 
especially among young people and in large cities. The more traditional chan-
nels, First Channel and Rossiia are more popular among old population and 
in rural areas.
In general, it is important to remember that media consumption reflects 
the widening social inequalities in contemporary Russian society which are 
accompanied by new forms of classification and division throughout the me-
dia and cultural field.
147
MEdIA AS A MIRROR OF CHANGE
Media culture
All post-Communist countries, Russia included, have imported a large 
amount of Western formats and practices to their media. In Russia, the ar-
rival of foreign formats has been the most visible in entertainment television 
(Rulyova 2007). Foreign influence is also obvious in Russia’s new business 
papers, which “increasingly resemble other media systems in market econo-
mies, although significant differences nevertheless exist” (Koikkalainen 2007, 
1326). Magazines, not least those representing the fashionable “glamour” life 
style, constitute another bulwark of Western mentality in the media culture 
(litovskaia & Shaburova 2010, 198).
Terhi Rantanen (2002, 133) has pointed out that Russia has already entered 
the third stage of globalization, that of declining globalization because “a sat-
uration point was reached and there was growing criticism against globaliza-
tion and a partial return to national values”. If “by September 2000, almost 
all soap operas were of foreign origin” (ibid., 99), the production of similar 
Russian programmes have replaced most of foreign imports since then. Al-
ready at the end of the 1990s, Russian-made programmes started to compete 
successfully with foreign ones; of the top ten serials four were Russian, three 
from latin America and one from the United States (ibid., 101–2). 
Natalia Mikhailova (2010, 189) has noted in her analysis of the Russian 
versions of Survivor reality show that, “the paradigm of the gender stere-
otypes presented in the show has changed, advancing towards the Western 
model of a successful woman” and that “the new Western behaviour practices 
were often presented in combination with the traditional Russian (or Soviet) 
concept of good behaviour”. In Russia, new formats of entertainment televi-
sion have not been approved without criticism. Accordingly, that “all of the 
major private Tv channels exhibited a high degree of social irresponsibility” 
with reference to “the scandalous programs ‘Behind the Glass’ (Za steklom, 
Tv 6), ‘Windows’ (Okna, TNT), and others” (Sharikov 2007, 90). The reality 
Tv show ‘Behind the Glass’ was made according to the format of Big Brother, 
and first aired in 2001 by television station Tv-6. Programmes which could 
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hardly been called “scandalous” like Pole Chudes, the Russian version of 
Wheel of Fortune format, have also been “seen as popular and of ‘bad taste’ 
(...) by the metropolitan intelligentsia” (Rulyova 2007, 1384).
This kind of critical attitude towards foreign formats has caused Russia to 
adopt Western practices more selectively than many smaller CEE countries. 
Also, foreign formats have been domesticated by merging them with tradi-
tions of Russian culture. Cultural and economic possibilities for these kinds 
of adaptations have been better in Russia.
In the field of news journalism the diffusion of Western news paradigm 
has been one of the key changes in the media in CEE countries. For example, 
in Estonia the professional news form of inverted pyramid became univer-
sal in one decade after the collapse of the Soviet system, while in Russia its 
adoption has been slower (Pietiläinen 2005). In Russia, the local conditions 
have been less amenable to adaptation to journalistic culture which would be 
detached from journalists’ own moral, political and religious principles and 
based on the audiences’ tastes and the performance of competing newspa-
pers.
Sticking to old traditions, and the importance of national traditions in oth-
er areas than journalism, also seems to be one of the characteristic features 
of Russian society. In accordance with the old traditions of publicist ideas, 
Russian journalists emphasize the need to assist their public and their role in 
developing intellectual and cultural interests of the public (Pasti & Pietiläinen 
2007). On the other hand, as shown by Svetlana Pasti (2007), journalists re-
flect the different generations in changing Russia – one rooted in the Soviet 
era, another made up of the transitional elements of the 1990s and the young-
est carrying a post-2000 world view. According to Olessia Koltsova (2006), 
Russian journalists are more controlled than their Western colleagues but 
less dominated.
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Media politics
After the collapse of Communist rule the political system was pluralized, 
competitive elections were held and the result of elections was in many cases 
the victory of the opposition in most CEE countries. This split among the po-
litical elite also had consequences for the media. “Political pressure on print 
journalism was moderated and pluralized in some countries, and terminat-
ed in others”, while “broadcast media remained at the forefront of attention 
among the new political elite” (Bajomi-lázár & Sükösd 2003, 31). 
After two decades of transformation, in most of the CEE countries the 
links between media and the political system are close. In that respect the 
media-politics relations in these countries resemble the situation in South-
ern European countries in which political clientelism, with close relations 
between press and politicians, has long traditions (Splichal 1994; Hallin & 
Mancini 2004). In Russia the situation is much the same. However, Natalia 
Roudakova (2008, 55) has pointed out that in Russia, unlike for example in 
Italy, the alliances between politicians and journalists are unstable and not 
rooted on clientelist ties and loyalties.
Russian relations between politics and media are in some respects less ob-
vious than in other CEE countries. Formally many media are private and in-
dependent but the control mechanisms exist, while journalists are also aware 
of them and possibly capable of resisting them, or at least understanding their 
problems. 
Public service television remains a rather weak idea in contemporary Rus-
sia and it seems unlikely that the State television channels would move com-
pletely to licence fees or budget funding. In general, the idea of public service 
broadcasting has not attracted much attention in Russia, obviously because 
both the political will and the public need have been lacking, as pointed out 
by Elena vartanova and Yassen zassoursky (2003). They regret this and take 
it as an indication of the underdevelopment of civil society. Yet “public serv-
ice broadcasting is both a part of and a condition for civil society in Russia” 
(ibid., 106).
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On the other hand, in Russia as elsewhere, the system of clientelism is un-
der pressure from globalization and marketization processes and these mar-
ket mechanisms affect the media in Russia in much the same way as else-
where. The new system which has formed in Russia is not stable and could be 
changed quite rapidly. 
What is different between Russia and practically all CEE countries, is that 
in the latter political power has been moved from one party or bloc to anoth-
er, in some case even in every parliamentary elections. In Russia, the “party in 
power” has remained in power even if its political support has fluctuated and 
not always been very strong (in 1995 10% of votes). Russian political power 
structure is much more closed than that of many CEE countries, which leaves 
little room for political dissent and competition, even if some forms of these 
persist in Russia. 
The Russian authorities have been eager to keep the most influential me-
dia, mainly national television, in their control. In principle, there is not much 
difference from some Western presidential regimes. For example, similar fea-
tures could be found in France during the Fifth Republic under de Gaulle in 
the 1960s and in Ukraine in the early 1990s (Chalaby 1998, 433). These fea-
tures include, first, the fact that the state is a key player in the media field and 
continues to exert firm control over public communications. Second, televi-
sion is a national institution and therefore enjoys a certain prestige, but has 
duties to present a positive image of the nation and foster national cohesion. 
Third, presidential regimes do not usually resort to overt or violent means of 
coercion against journalists and, fourth, they tolerate opposition papers, but 
presidents do exert personal control over television (ibid., 437). What con-
cerns Gaullist France and Ukraine is also valid in post-Soviet Russia. 
Sarah Oates (2006, 29) has pointed out that “Russia technically has a di-
verse system of media ownership for its major media outlets, but realistically 
there is no central media outlet that can challenge the Kremlin’s monopoly on 
power and information”. Suggesting a “neo-Soviet model of the media” Oates 
(2009, 55) claims that “the Russian media is again a tool for the elites rather 
than a watchdog of the masses”. 
It is obvious that the Russian state has aimed to marginalize the dissenting 
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views and has been rather successful in doing so. The result of this process is 
not very far from the practice of developed Western societies, in which the 
general rule is that the more dissenting a view is, the more marginalized it 
will be. In Russia, this process is certainly more visible than elsewhere and 
the “invisible hand” of economic forces which marginalize dissenting views is 
more apparent and looks more the hand of the state than that of the market.
According to Alexei Pankin (1998, 32), the Russian media model is char-
acterized by the following features: authorities’ unwillingness or inability to 
conduct radical reform, their unwillingness to either let media go completely 
their own way, or to fully subsidize them; early accumulation of national cap-
ital and an above average level of corruption. In this system, media do not live 
by the market, but a great amount of diversity can be found.
Boris dubin (2004) concludes his analysis of the collective identity of Rus-
sian society with a keyword “stabilization”: media promoting average world 
view with little choice. This again feeds depolitization of society particularly 
through television infotainment “massage” which substitutes political life 
and civic participation. dubin’s (2005) assessment of the period 1995–2005 
subscribes to a déjà vu among many socio-political observers – back to the 
Brezhnev and earlier times.
Future prospects
There is no shortage of critical voices assessing the contemporary Russian 
media landscape, coming mostly from the West but also easy to find inside 
Russia (see vartanova, Nieminen & Salminen 2009). The standard question 
asked is whether Putin’s media policies mean a return to the Soviet system. 
However, such a simplistic question is not analytically helpful and moreover 
contrary to Russian reality.
A more balanced approach is provided by Birgit Beumers, Stephen Hutch-
ings and Natalia Rulyova (2009) in an impressive anthology of mainly West-
ern academics with different angles of more or less critical approach to where 
the Russian media landscape has been going in the 2000s. They make a point 
WITNESSING CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA
152
of the “conflicting signals” coming from the landscape, and their editors’ in-
troduction avoids a definite verdict: “If this leaves the reader unable to draw a 
single, coherent message from the volume, then we will consider our task suc-
cessfully completed, for such a situation mirrors the state of affairs prevailing 
upon the ever-shifting sands of the post-Soviet media landscape.” (ibid., 25)
The same view is shared by Mikhail Fedotov, Minister of Press and Infor-
mation 1992–3 and one of the main architects of the post-Soviet media law5, 
who perceives that Russia is moving in opposite directions simultaneously, 
“including movement from autocracy to democracy and from democracy 
to autocracy, since the elements of both regimes are visible in our ideology, 
propaganda, and law”.6 His assessment serves as a baseline for the future:
However, as the market in this country is inadequate, flawed, perverse, far from being 
up to world standards, and so is democracy, the reforms introduced here often yield 
the results opposite to those declared. Thus, the legal ban on censorship in the media 
has resulted in a mixed model of Soviet and Western styles of interaction between the 
authorities and the media, which embodies the worst features that have ever existed in 
the countries of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO… 
In turn, the conception of independent mass media has altogether lost its clarity. 
In the early 90s, this conception more or less adequately reflected the editorial policies 
of non-government media. Starting from the mid-90s, the most influential non-gov-
ernment media gradually came to be instruments of political influence in the hands of 
financial and industrial groups, to varying degrees associated with the Kremlin. How-
ever, now and then business interests of those groups were contradictory, this is why the 
information flows generated by them formed an incomplete but stereoscopic and col-
ourful picture of reality. In those days, a large number of Russians aspired for expanding 
information pluralism due to emergence of new media holdings which would less and 
less depend on the state. The opposite was really the case, however, and as soon as the 
degree to which the financial and industrial groups were affiliated with the Kremlin 
exceeded reasonable limits, the information picture of the world became flat, black-and-
white and clearly divided into ‘us’ and ‘them’. 
It would be wrong to say that such a monochrome landscape is characteristic of the 
Russian media as a whole: in fact, beyond the national Tv channels and state-run me-
dia, the landscape remains fairly multicoloured. Here the ‘yellow’ press goes together 
with glossy magazines, religious press – with popular science editions, business publi-
cations – with editions for the youth. Such variability is especially typical of the print 
5 See Nordenstreng et al. 2002, 218–51.
6 Personal Communication with Professor Mikhail Fedotov, Moscow (April 2009).
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media, which involve an increasing number of ‘niche’ editions. In radio and television 
broadcasting segmentation is also present, though to a lesser extent, since the natural 
resource of radio frequencies is limited. But whatever the sector of the media, the domi-
nant components are entertainment and propaganda. 
Another analytical voice from inside Russia comes from Ivan zassoursky 
(2009), who follows up his comments written five years earlier and quoted 
above:
The question of whether the media will be controlled tightly in the future is one of 
theoretical debate right now, where pros and cons can be weighted but no one can say 
for sure. What is important, though, is to see how the media function in a historical 
perspective, and here it is easy to map what can be called a spiral of control, or a spiral 
of freedom. (ibid., 40)
The spiral suggested by zassoursky runs through the thaw of the 1960s and 
the Brezhnev years of the 1970s, followed by glasnost and perestroika, leading 
to Yeltsin’s “Second Republic”, which by now has evolved to Putin’s “Third 
Empire”: 
 
…the new Russian Empire seems to me like an iceberg melting in the Internet. A glo-
bal information environment slowly but surely becomes the medium of choice for the 
new generation, bringing with it new possibilities, new habits and even new values […] 
There is no way to predict how fast and effective the Internet onslaught will be: it will 
not be direct, that is for sure. The Soviet Union could never be conquered by the military 
assault it expected, nor can the […] Russian political system be swept away by mass un-
rest. But it can be bypassed, or made more effective in dealing with everyday problems 
through an open flow of information and communication about issues of public inter-
est. It can be more accountable and more transparent, and evolve when the generation 
of net users becomes the dominant generation and their values become the norm. The 
ruler in the Kremlin is not the problem: the power has to be there, and someone has to 
be the president. It is the system of administration in Russia that has to change, when 
the time is ripe. (ibid., 40–1)
Arja Rosenholm, Kaarle Nordenstreng and Elena Trubina (2010, 2) also 
call for moderation in assessments of the state of Russian media. The cur-
rent historical situation is ambiguous, while the post-socialist transforma-
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tions and the global media market offer the readers and viewers a new kind of 
pluralism combined with a fragmentation of knowledge, norms and values. 
This requires of an individual reader new skills and media literacy in order 
to navigate in the plethora of fragmented messages, new genres and media 
formats. In the individualized situation which characterizes Russian social 
and cultural life today the receiver is offered innumerable options and alter-
natives. However, the reader’s and viewer’s freedom is accompanied by a con-
flict originating in the new technologies of control and normalization based 
on both market and political pressures. The conclusion is that the Russian 
media is far from being homogenous and that the mass media – not unlike 
the Western media – is a powerful but not primary agent in society.
Concerning media policy, Anna Arutunyan (2009, 80–1) has criticized the 
state-led efforts to liberate the press, which are, by definition, counterproduc-
tive: “a free press is one that is established from the bottom up, not from the 
top down”. Therefore the conditions for independent media should happen 
on all levels simultaneously, starting from the journalist himself. Erik Albre-
cht (2008, 110–1) emphasized that not just state policy, but also journalis-
tic culture is a key factor in developing press freedom and that much of the 
Soviet journalistic cultures still prevails in Russia. Pasti (2010) for her part 
points out that the new post-Soviet generation of journalists who have grown 
up surrounded by consumerism and market values, is pursuing “pragmatic 
individualism” and working in the state media as “mercenaries” but in the 
private media as “artists”. Therefore a more profound cultural change will be 
needed, not only among political leadership but also among journalists and 
the population at large. 
While media scholars have usually concentrated on political news me-
dia, more invisible developments have been going on in the field of popular 
culture, which also acts as an agent for social change. Since the early 1990s, 
glossy and glamour magazines have changed the Russian media sphere in 
a remarkable way. Many of these magazines (Cosmopolitan, Glamour, Elle, 
Vogue) based on Western formats enjoy huge readerships and have already 
promoted a value change in post-Soviet Russia. The aim of these magazines 
has been to create a new man (Bartlett 2006, 196; Rudova 2008, 2), an objec-
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tive which is not far from the Soviet idea of a new man, although the qualities 
associated are completely different. As a result, it might well be the case that 
the social change promoted by the media will not happen with the political 
power struggle but with a slower cultural change which is taking place in 
Russia.
The change from the Soviet media system to the current system has been 
rapid, but not without setbacks. The result, in many ways a strikingly West-
ernized media system and media content, is something that only few would 
have expected 25 years ago. In 2010 Russians live in a media sphere in which 
they can access a huge variety of views and entertainment, and also, if Inter-
net is included, to express their opinions. True, the television news and cur-
rent affairs programmes differ quite a lot from their Western counterparts by 
not exercising criticism of the powers that be. Also true, the problems caused 
to the working journalists by state and other institutions are numerous, in 
the most extreme form with a high rate of killing of journalists. These facts, 
however, should not blind researchers to the important changes and develop-
ments which are going on in Russia.
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